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Green Haircuts: Federal Reserve Collateral Policies
That Incorporate Climate Risk
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change has long-term economic impacts, such as
disruption of industry by way of extreme weather events and shortages in
natural resources.1 These threats have led to the integration of various
ways to quantify the impacts of climate change on the financial sector.2
Global banks, investors, and companies are currently finding ways to
evaluate climate risk through actions surrounding environmental, social,
and governance ratings,3 Securities and Exchange Commission
disclosure regimes,4 intervention by various United States federal
regulators,5 and mandates by regulatory authorities in other countries.6
1. See Vladimir Stenek, et al., Climate Risk and Financial Institutions: Challenges and
Opportunities, INT’L FIN. CORP. OF THE WORLD BANK GRP., 1, 101 (2010),
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/fe18be47-a0cc-4b5d-a134078a995ce8bd/ClimateRisk_FinancialInstitutions.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=n48iBMz
[https://perma.cc/X4TA-GWXM] (discussing the risks posed by climate change to various
financial sector participants).
2. See id. at 22 (discussing increasing loss contingencies increasing as risks of climate
change continue to be quantified).
3. “Environmental, Social, and Governance Ratings” refers to long-term material risks
with regards to a company’s operations as it relates to environmental, social, and governance
issues. There is not a uniform industry metric or investment type at time of writing, and
various ratings agencies and other companies have set forth their own standards. See ESG
Ratings,
MSCI
https://www.msci.com/our-solutions/esg-investing/esg-ratings
[https://perma.cc/NF3A-R3MW] (last accessed Oct. 17, 2021) (explaining the use of ESG
ratings to determine material environmental, social, and governance related factors for
companies).
4. See Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Prepared Remarks Before the
Principles for Responsible Investment “Climate and Global Financial Markets” Webinar,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 28, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-pri2021-07-28 [https://perma.cc/7GP9-4S6B] (public statement) (discussing upcoming
proposed rule on mandatory climate disclosure).
5. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight
Council Identifies Climate Change as an Emerging and Increasing Threat to Financial
Stability,
(Oct.
21,
2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0426
[https://perma.cc/LJU3-2WNU] (discussing the Federal Stability Oversight Council’s
assessment of various financial risks posed by climate change).
6. See The Three European Supervisory Authorities Publish Final Report and Draft
RTS on Disclosures Under SFDR, EUR. SEC. AND MKTS. AUTH. (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/three-european-supervisory-authoritiespublish-final-report-and-draft-rts [https://perma.cc/7N5A-UD5K] (discussing the Joint
Committee of the three European Supervisory Authorities draft Regulatory Technical
standards for sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector).
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Climate change poses unique challenges to banks and the financial
system as a whole, since direct and indirect environmental changes
impact various sectors such as public health, agricultural yields, public
infrastructure, and real property—all of which are reliant upon credit or
have assets utilized by banks.7 Consequently, banks must account for
environmental impacts across many industries and evaluate risks to asset
prices, credit availability, and cash flows.8
The Federal Reserve is responsible for the promotion of financial
system stability and the supervision and regulation of financial
institutions, in addition to its other functions.9 Pursuant to these stability
and regulation responsibilities, the Federal Reserve engages in "Discount
Window” lending and “Section 13(3)” lending.10 Discount Window
lending is the Federal Reserve’s lending to depository institutions such
as banks.11 Section 13(3) lending is the Federal Reserve’s speciallytailored lending programs in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”12 The
2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the
Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) lending abilities, as numerous facilities
were opened to provide liquidity directly to borrowers and investors.13
Many of the Federal Reserve loans under Section 13(3) and the
Discount Window must be secured.14 However, the Federal Reserve’s
7. See Celso Brunetti et al., Climate Change and Financial Stability, FED. RES. BD.
(Mar. 19, 2021) https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/climate-changeand-financial-stability-20210319.htm [https://perma.cc/G25X-FL97] (discussing the
intercorrelated risks of climate change on the financial system).
8. Id.
9. See FED. RES. SYS. PUB., The Fed Explained: What the Central Bank Does, 55 (Aug.
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/the-fed-explained.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BTL2-VFUU] (explaining the Federal Reserve’s stability functions).
10. Id.
11. See Discount Window Lending, FED. RES. BD (Dec. 30, 2021)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm [https://perma.cc/K8UTDZFV] (providing background on the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window lending).
12. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(A) (2018).
13. See FED. RES. BD., Crisis Response: Credit and Liquidity Programs and the
Balance Sheet, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZG7Q-ZXNY] (last accessed Oct. 17, 2021) (discussing the monetary
policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve in response to the 2008 financial crisis in order
to “foster maximum employment and price stability”); see also Richard H. Clarida et al., The
COVID-19 Crisis and the Federal Reserve’s Policy Response (2021), at 8,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2021035pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2QHQY4E ] (discussing actions taken by the Federal Reserve with regards to liquidity and funding
operations).
14. Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks, FED. RES. BD. 72 (July
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/BSTfinaccountingmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G484-52PN].
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collateral requirements do not properly account for the hazards posed by
climate risk.15 This improper valuation of risk poses problems for the
economy as well as the Federal Reserve’s secured interests in loans it
provides by not accounting for the potential of rapid devaluation of
assets,16 sudden supply shocks,17 and climate disasters.18
The Federal Reserve should reduce the value of the assets it
receives as collateral via a “haircut”19 for its Section 13(3) and Discount
Window lending programs, in order to account for the risks posed to these
assets.20 However, the Federal Reserve should not stray into “screening”
assets into or out of out of eligibility for its lending programs based solely
upon the potential effects of climate change upon the asset,21 as this
would lead to greenwashing,22 which is the act of giving the appearance
of environmentally-friendly business practices while failing to change
any underlying business practices.23 Such greenwashing could contribute
to an asset bubble.24 This Note discusses the development of the Federal
Reserve’s lending programs in response to financial crises as well as its
“standard” Discount Window operations, then analyzes opportunities for
climate risk analysis to be integrated into its secured lending operations
to mitigate some of the deleterious effects of climate change on the
financial system, and insulate the financial system against preventable
climate-related shocks.25 This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II
15. See infra Part III (discussing the various hazards posed to Federal Reserve
collateral by climate risk).
16. See infra Part III.B.1 & 2 (discussing the physical risks to collateral, such as fire
and flood, as well as the lack of risk adjustment in pricing—all of which could cause rapid
devaluation of Federal Reserve collateral); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing recent rapiddevaluation events).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See infra Part II.C (discussing Federal Reserve collateral margin and haircuts).
20. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the NGFS recommendation of negative collateral
haircuts to properly value collateral that the Federal Reserve accepts for its lending programs).
21. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing how improper pricing of assets could incentivize
greenwashing).
22. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the green assets and greenwashing).
23. Leyla Acaroglu, What is Greenwashing? How to Spot It and Stop It, MEDIUM (July
8, 2019), https://medium.com/disruptive-design/what-is-greenwashing-how-to-spot-it-andstop-it-c44f3d130d5 [https://perma.cc/X7R3-MWED].
24. An economic “bubble” consists of the rapid inflation of an asset, or assets, due to
market exuberance rather than the fundamental value of the asset or assets. Typically, bubbles
result in “crash” when the asset or assets drop in value rapidly. See Will Kenton, What Is A
Bubble?, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bubble.asp
[https://perma.cc/MV3G-P3E9] (explaining what an economic bubble is); see also infra Part
IV (discussing how greenwashing could contribute to an asset bubble).
25. Infra Parts II, III, & IV.
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provides background information on the Federal Reserve’s stability and
regulation responsibilities, lending powers, collateral policies, and
climate financial risk.26 Part III discusses critiques of the Federal
Reserve’s collateral framework with regards to its current valuation of
climate-risks.27 Part IV explains why the Federal Reserve should
integrate haircuts based upon climate risk into its collateral policies to
properly fulfill its stability and regulation mandates.28 Part V summarizes
the arguments of this note and draws a conclusion.29
II. BACKGROUND
The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States, and
is responsible for five functions: conducting the nation’s monetary policy
in order to promote maximum employment and stable prices; promoting
the stability of the financial system; promoting the safety and soundness
of individual financial institutions; fostering payment and settlement
system safety and efficiency; and promoting consumer protection and
community development.30 Relevant to this Note is the Federal
Reserve’s functions as a promoter of financial system stability, as it is
pursuant to its stability authority that the Federal Reserve monitors
systemic risk, attempts to head off shocks to the financial system, and
actively intervenes to provide liquidity to financial institutions and
individual borrowers during times of great financial strain.31 In order to
provide liquidity, two significant programs utilized by the Federal
Reserve are the Discount Window and Section 13(3) lending during times
of crisis.32
A.

The Federal Reserve’s Discount Window Lending

A significant amount of the Federal Reserve’s lending operations
consist of secured loans to depository institutions via the Discount
26. Infra Part II.
27. Infra Part III.
28. Infra Part IV.
29. Infra Part V.
30. See FED. RES. BD., The Fed Explained: What the Central Bank Does, 1 (Aug.
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/the-fed-explained.pdf#page=8
[https://perma.cc/QC29-4VVZ] (explaining the Federal reserve’s five functions).
31. See id. at 52-60 (explaining the Federal Reserve’s authority pursuant to its stability
mandate).
32. Id.
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Window.33 Such Discount Window loans are available to depository
institutions at all times.34 Discount Window lending is designed to
promote liquidity and stability in the financial system and to ensure that
depository institutions can continue to provide credit during times of
market stress.35 This liquidity is essential to providing the continued
function of the credit markets during times of stress and prevents negative
consequences such as the withdrawal of credit to borrowers.36
There are several different programs that the Federal Reserve
uses for its Discount Window lending, set forth in Section 10B of the
Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Reserve’s “Regulation A.”37 These
programs consist of primary credit, secondary credit, and seasonal
credit.38 Primary credit is referred to by the Federal Reserve as the
“principal safety valve for ensuring adequate liquidity in the banking
system.”39 Loans through primary credit are available for up to ninety
days and have no limits on the use of funds borrowed by the depository
institution.40 Secondary credit is designed for institutions who do not
qualify for primary credit, is typically on an overnight basis, and may not
be used to fund the expansion of the borrower’s assets.41 Finally,
seasonal credit is designed to assist “small depository institutions” with
seasonal liquidity pressures such as fluctuations on loans and deposits
caused by college tuition payments, farming, and other seasonal
activities.42
B.

The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Powers

Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act allows the Federal
Reserve to provide liquidity to nonbank entities in pursuit of financial
system stability for “unusual and exigent circumstances.”43 The Federal
Reserve utilized its Section 13(3) powers during the COVID-19
33. See FED. RES. BD., The Discount Window and Discount Rate (last updated Jan. 11,
2022),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm
[https://perma.cc/K8DT-ZS3T] (discussing the Federal Reserve Discount Window).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Discount Window Lending, supra note 11.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(B)(i) (2018).
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pandemic,44 as well as during the 2008 Financial Crisis.45 To qualify for
Section 13(3) lending, firms must still have sufficient collateral similar to
the Discount Window.46 However, collateral eligibility is generally more
expansive than through the Discount Window,47 because depository
institutions are highly regulated and restricted with the types of assets
they are allowed to hold in the first place.48 For Section 13(3) lending,
the Federal Reserve must ensure that the value of any collateral is
consistent with “sound risk management practices” in order to “ensure
protection for the taxpayer.”49 Furthermore, “the security for emergency
loans [must be] sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses . . .” and the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors “shall require that a Federal reserve
bank assign, consistent with sound risk management practices and to
ensure protection for the taxpayer, a lendable value to all collateral for a
loan executed by a Federal reserve bank.”50
In response to the individualized bailouts of the 2008 crisis—
which led to vastly different outcomes for different firms51—the Federal
Reserve’s emergency lending powers were modified in the 2010 DoddFrank Act to disallow individually-tailored bailouts.52 As such, all
44. See N.Y. FED. RES., Federal Reserve 13(3) Facilities Announced During COVID19
Pandemic
(Apr.
9,
2020)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/blog/2020/LSE_2020_COVIDfed-response_fleming [https://perma.cc/65WH-AN2Y] (listing the Federal Reserve 13(3)
facilities enacted during COVID-19).
45. See FED. RES. BD., The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to
Support Overall Market Liquidity: Function, Status, and Risk Management (Nov. 2010),
https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-2310_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8SU-7F2Q] (discussing the Federal Reserve 13(3) lending
facilities utilized during the 2008 financial crisis).
46. See id. at 4 tbl.A (providing a brief overview of each of the 2008 Section 13(3)
lending programs).
47. See BENEDICT WELLER, ET AL., The Collateral Frameworks of the Eurosystem, the
Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the Financial Market Turmoil, ECB
OCCASIONAL
PAPER
NO.
107,
27
(Dec.
29,
2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325248
[https://perma.cc/6JBASE2A] (explaining the Federal Reserve’s expanded collateral eligibility in response to the
2008 Financial Crisis).
48. See MARC LABONTE & DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46779, OVER THE
LINE: ASSET THRESHOLDS IN BANK REGULATION, 1 (May 3, 2021),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46779.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZQX-TQYA] (“Banking is one of
the most heavily regulated industries in the United States due to its key role in the economy,
its inherent risks, and the potential taxpayer exposures it creates.”).
49. 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(B)(i) (2018).
50. 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3) (2018).
51. See infra Part II.A (discussing the outcomes of Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Bear
Stearns in the context of the Federal Reserve’s evaluation of their respective collateral).
52. See FED. RES. BD., Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Specifying its
Procedures for Emergency Lending under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (Nov. 30,
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lending programs are required to have “broad eligibility” with regards to
borrowers.53 Additionally, under Section 13(3), the Federal Reserve
cannot aid failing financial companies or insolvent borrowers.54 While
individual bailouts no longer exist, firms wishing to use any of the
Federal Reserve’s emergency lending programs or facilities with broadbased eligibility must still provide sufficient collateral for any loans they
get from the Federal Reserve.55
C.

Assets Eligible for Federal Reserve Secured Lending

Discount Window loans provided by the Federal Reserve must be
fully collateralized “to the satisfaction of the lending Reserve Bank.”56
Similarly, Section 13(3) collateral must be “sufficient to protect taxpayers
from losses[.]”57 The Federal Reserve accepts a variety of collateral
pursuant to its Section 13(3) and Discount Window lending.58 While
Section 13(3) provides the Federal Reserve with much more discretion in
determining what it may accept as collateral, much of the collateral is the

2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z2LC-Z6BD] (discussing the Federal Reserve Board’s final rule and the
requirement of broad eligibility).
53. Id.
54. 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(A) (2018).
55. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(B)(i) (stating that “The policies and procedures
established by the Board shall require that a Federal reserve bank assign, consistent with
sound risk management practices and to ensure protection for the taxpayer, a lendable value
to all collateral for a loan executed by a Federal reserve bank under this paragraph in
determining whether the loan is secured satisfactorily for purposes of this paragraph.”).
56. FED. RES. BD., Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet (last updated
May 13, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_ratesetting.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z5AV-YFWH] [hereinafter Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance
Sheet].
57. BENEDICT WELLER, ET AL, supra note 47.
58. See FED. RES. DISC. WINDOW, PAYMENT SYS. RISK, Discount Window Margins and
Collateral
Guidelines,
FED.
RES.
(June
1,
2021),
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Home/Pages/Collateral/Discount%20Window%20Mar
gins%20and%20Collateral%20Guidelines#none
[https://perma.cc/KP2F-SNQG]
[hereinafter Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines] (explaining that Federal
Reserve member banks accept as collateral: U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities;
Government Sponsored Enterprise Securities; Foreign Government Guaranteed Securities
and Brady Bonds; Foreign Government Agency Bonds; Supranational Bills, Notes, Bonds,
and Zero Coupons; Investment Grade and AAA-rated Corporate Bonds; German Jumbo
AAA-rated Bonds; Municipal Bonds; Asset Backed Securities; Collateralized Debt
Obligations; Collateralized Loan Obligations; Agency-Backed Mortgage Securities; NonAgency Residential Mortgage Backed Securities; Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities;
Trust Preferred Securities; and Certificates of Deposit, Bankers’ Acceptances, Commercial
Paper, and Asset-Backed Commercial Paper).
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same as that accepted under the Discount Window.59 This collateral is
valued at the fair market value of the asset, accounting for volatility over
the period the loan to the bank is outstanding.60
The Federal Reserve accepts mortgage-backed securities as
collateral for a variety of different programs. Under its Discount Window
lending, the Federal Reserve accepts residential mortgage securities
backed by federal agencies, investment grade-rated non-agency
residential mortgage-backed securities, and AAA-rated commercial
mortgage-backed securities.61 Additionally, the Federal Reserve accepts
individual loans for commercial real estate, farm real estate, first and
second lien mortgages for one to four family residences, and mortgages
for five-plus family residences.62
The Federal Reserve also accepts mortgages as collateral for a
variety of its past and present Section 13(3) liquidity facilities. Programs
which accepted mortgages as collateral during the pandemic include the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility63 and the Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility.64 During the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Federal
Reserve accepted mortgages as collateral under the Primary, Secondary,
Seasonal, and Term Asset Facility Credit facilities; the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility; the Term Securities Lending Facility and Term Securities
Lending Facility Options Program.; and the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”).65
Under its Discount Window lending, the Federal Reserve
generally accepts investment grade-rated corporate bonds in U.S.
currency as well as AAA-rated foreign bonds in various foreign
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The Primary Dealer Credit Facility accepted obligations from the following
mortgage-centered federally related entities: Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation,
Federal Home Loan Bank System, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac),
and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) with margin percentages from
105% to 159%. FED. RES. BANK OF NY, Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Collateral Schedule
(Apr. 9, 2020) https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primary-dealer-credit-facility/primarydealer-credit-facility-collateral-schedule
[https://perma.cc/HZA3-VL8H]
[hereinafter
Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Collateral Schedule].
64. See FED. RES. BD., Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (Nov. 30, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20201130a2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DHP-PW9N] [hereinafter Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility]
(stating that securities issued by U.S. Government Sponsored Entities qualifies as collateral
for the facility).
65. Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, supra note 56.
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currencies, AAA-rated collateralized debt obligations, AAA-rated
collateralized loan obligations, and individual corporate loans.66 During
the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve accepted corporate bonds
and loans for its Primary, Secondary, Seasonal, and TALF; Primary
Dealer Credit Facility; Term Securities Lending Facility and Term
Securities Lending Facility Options Program; and ABCP.67 During the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Reserve accepted corporate bonds and
loans as collateral for its Commercial Paper Funding Facility;68 Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility;69 and Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loans.70
The Federal Reserve applies both “haircuts” and “margins” to
collateral it receives under the Discount Window and Section 13(3).71
Many consider the difference between a haircut and margin to be a matter
of expression, with haircut being “a percentage deduction from the
market value of collateral,” such as a 5% reduction, and margin being
“the initial market value of collateral expressed as a percentage of the
purchase price,” such as 120% margin.72 With regards to Discount
Window lending, the Federal Reserve applies a haircut based upon
perceived risk of the loan, and a “margin” based upon the general
liquidity of the asset class.73 In other words, a margin is applied on top
66. Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, supra note 58.
67. Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, supra note 56.
68. Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Collateral Schedule, supra note 63.
69. Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, supra note 64.
70. See FED. RES. BD., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (July 28, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200728a6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HMZ6-U7UL] [hereinafter Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility].
71. See FED. RES. DISC. WINDOW, PAYMENT SYS. RISK, Federal Reserve Collateral
Guidelines,
18
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/~/media/documents/frcollguidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KPA-5LNE] [hereinafter Federal Reserve Collateral Guidelines] (noting
that “An additional haircut will generally be applied to collateral that is pledged by depository
institutions in financial condition that is consistent with eligibility for the secondary credit
program.”); see also MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44185, Federal Reserve:
Emergency Lending, 13 (Mar. 27, 2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44185.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DUU7-S434] (discussing which Section 13(3) lending facilities created in
2008 received haircuts as part of the terms and conditions of the loans).
72. INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N, What is a haircut? (last accessed Dec. 20, 2021),
https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateralmarkets/icma-ercc-publications/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/21-what-is-a-haircut/
[https://perma.cc/2ET3-RFL5].
73. Compare Federal Reserve Collateral Guidelines, supra note 71 at 18 (noting that
“An additional haircut will generally be applied to collateral that is pledged by depository
institutions in financial condition that is consistent with eligibility for the secondary credit
program.”), with Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, supra note 58
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of the fair market value estimate of collateral, and haircuts change the fair
market value estimate of the collateral.74 Securities pledged as collateral
for loans must be at least investment grade,75 but in some cases they may
be required to be as high as AAA-rated.76 Securities are valued using
prices supplied by external vendors.77 With regards to the acceptance of
individual loans as collateral, the general requirements are that they not
be past due by thirty or sixty days, not be subject to external constraints,
and that the pledging institution has rights that sufficiently grant a
perfected security interest to the Federal Reserve bank making the loan.78
In sum, the Federal Reserve wants the actual, realistic value of the
collateral. This is consistent with the intention of the Federal Reserve’s
liquidity programs, which are designed to address liquidity crises, and not
prevent insolvent borrowers from going out of business.79
D.

Climate Financial Risks

Climate change decreases the stability of the financial system.80
Direct financial effects of climate change include decreases in labor
productivity and public health, weather related damage, and decreasing
agricultural yields, among other problems.81 These financial effects can
then spread to the entire financial system by way of shocks causing rapid
repricing of assets, decreases in credit, and cascading effects across
(discussing margins to be applied to whole asset classes, e.g. agency-backed mortgage
securities).
74. Id.
75. See What Does Investment Grade Mean?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-does-investment-grade-mean/
[https://perma.cc/69BB-WYM2] (“Investment grade refers to the quality of a company's
credit. To be considered an investment grade issue, the company must be rated at 'BBB' or
higher by Standard and Poor's or Moody's. Anything below this 'BBB' rating is considered
non-investment grade.”).
76. See FED. RES. DISC. WINDOW, PAYMENT SYS. RISK, Discount Window Collateral
Eligibility,
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/pages/collateral/collateral_eligibility
[https://perma.cc/6AER-XBVT] (last accessed Dec. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Discount Window
Collateral Eligibility] (outlining the assets accepted by the Federal Reserve for its Discount
Window lending, and the general eligibility standard for those assets).
77. See Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, supra note 58
(explaining the valuation process for Federal Reserve collateral).
78. See Federal Reserve Collateral Guidelines, supra note 71 at 11-12 (explaining the
acceptance criteria for individual loans).
79. 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(B)(i) (2018).
80. See Celso Brunetti et al., supra note 7 (explaining the various risks posed to the
financial system by climate change).
81. Id.
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various financial markets which depend upon the assets affected by
climate change.82
Risks posed to the financial system by climate change are
generally separated into the categories of physical risk and transition
risk.83 Physical risks are those caused by the effect of climate change on
the physical environment, such as rising sea levels, increased extreme
weather events, and warmer temperatures.84 Transition risks are those
caused by moving away from carbon-based industries in order to curb
global emissions, such as rapid depreciation in the value of oil assets due
to increased regulatory oversight.85 Real property and the financial
activities surrounding it face some of the greatest risks of shock due to
the potential for large swaths of collateral to be entirely eliminated from
physical risks,86 but collateral derived from corporate activities can also
face significant transition risks.87
III. EFFECTS OF FEDERAL RESERVE COLLATERAL POLICIES AND CLIMATE
RISK
In addition to increasing the liquidity of certain assets, and thus
their value, the Federal Reserve’s acceptance of certain forms of
collateral is often the line between a firm’s bankruptcy and coming out
of a crisis with renewed vigor.88 The Federal Reserve’s collateral policies
act as a backstop when companies are having liquidity problems from
economic crises, which can have significant effects on markets.89 For
instance, if the Federal Reserve accepts igloos as collateral but not

82. Id.
83. See GOV. LAEL BRAINARD, FED. RES. BD., Financial Stability Implications of
Climate
Change
(Mar.
23,
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210323a.htm
[https://perma.cc/FDJ2-FZ9F] (“Financial market participants that do not put in place
frameworks to assess and address climate-related risks could face significant losses on
climate-sensitive assets caused by environmental shifts, by a disorderly transition, or both.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See infra III.B.1 (detailing physical risks to real property and the ways that risk is
currently underpriced).
87. See infra III.B.2 (discussing risks posed to corporate bonds).
88. See infra III.A (explaining the significant backstop that Federal Reserve loan
eligibility provides).
89. See Colleen M. Baker, The Federal Reserve as Collateral’s Last Resort, 96 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2021) (“The institutional features of these frameworks, which are
a result of legislation and central bank policy, can influence the production, liquidity, and
pricing of assets that markets use as collateral.”).
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widgets, it is likely that—all other things being equal—there will be more
igloos brought into existence.90 The Federal Reserve may incentivize
financially unsound activities, pose risks to taxpayer funds, and generally
raise the risk of systemic shock to the financial system if it does not
properly incorporate climate risk into its collateral policies.91 These risks
are posed by both the Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) operations as well
as its Discount Window lending.92
A.

Section 13(3) Specific Risks

With regards to its Section 13(3) lending, the Federal Reserve’s
acceptance of an asset as collateral can amount to a declaration that it
believes an asset is of value despite lenders—and potentially the market
as a whole—not viewing it as such.93 The collateral requirements of
Section 13(3) loans can result in situations where the Federal Reserve’s
designation of “sufficient collateral” is determinative of whether a firm
survives an economic crisis.94 In this capacity, the Federal Reserve ends
up acting as an incredibly significant backstop for companies facing
economic strain in times of crisis.95 As such, collateral accepted for
Federal Reserve lending programs is significantly more valuable to firms
than that which is not.96
The market effect of the Federal Reserve backstopping
“sufficiently collateralized” companies in economic distress was
exemplified in the 2008 Financial Crisis by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. While Lehman Brothers lacked sufficient collateral, the assets
of its competitors (AIG and Bear Stearns) qualified for Federal Reserve
90. See Kjell G. Nybrog, Central Bank Collateral Frameworks, J. OF BANKING & FIN.
(Mar.
2017),
83
at
232-248,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S037842661630259X
[https://perma.cc/7VNL-RMBK] (stating “collateral frameworks may have distortive effects
on financial markets and the wider economy. They can, for example, bias the private provision
of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy as well as
contribute to financial instability.”).
91. See infra III.A & B.
92. Id.
93. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 343(3)(A) (2018) (stating that participants in Section 13(3)
lending facilities must be “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other
banking institutions”).
94. See Baker, supra note 89 (explaining that during financial crises, sufficient
collateral to meet the requirements set for by central bank liquidity lines is the defining line
between a firm being illiquid—and thus able to secure central bank funding—and insolvent).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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credit.97 Because of the lack of a financial backstop, potential purchasers
of Lehman Brothers walked away, resulting in Lehman Brothers filing
for bankruptcy.98 In contrast, Bear Stearns was bought by J.P. Morgan,
who secured a Federal Reserve loan with the assets of Bear Sterns.99 AIG
utilized a Federal Reserve loan and still exists today.100

B.

Discount Window and Collateral Risks

Discount Window lending occurs during non-crisis times, so the
Federal Reserve is not providing value for something that has no general
market valuation.101 Because the Federal Reserve is not acting as a
backstop to institutions who have no other options for credit, the risks
posed by the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window lending is largely
derived from market mispricing the collateral the Federal Reserve is
accepting.102 However, the risks posed to mortgage-backed securities
and corporate bonds are significant.103
1. Mortgage-Backed Securities
Significant stability and climate change risks arise from the
Federal Reserve’s acceptance of commercial and residential real property
as collateral. The Federal Reserve accepts mortgage-backed securities as

97. See BEN BERNANKE, FMR, CHAIRMAN, FED. RES. BD., Current Economic and
Financial
Conditions
(Oct.
7,
2008)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081007a.htm
[https://perma.cc/M9BL-QHKL] (explaining how Lehman Brothers did not have sufficient
collateral to secure a loan from the Federal Reserve).
98. See Carrick Mollenkamp et. al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG
Seeks
Cash,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
16,
2008),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122145492097035549 [https://perma.cc/UV2S-Q4NN].
99. Maria Godoy, Fed’s Moves Highlight Fragile State of Markets, NPR (Mar. 17,
2008,
5:20
PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88425128
[https://perma.cc/3YF9-N3QN].
100. Mollenkamp et al., supra note 98.
101. See Baker, supra note 89 (explaining how Section 13(3) lending occurs for assets
which have no general market valuation).
102. See infra III.B.1 & 2 (explaining how mortgage-backed securities and corporate
bonds are mispriced).
103. Id.
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collateral for its lending programs104 through the Discount Window 105 in
addition to many Section 13(3) lending programs past and present.106
There is a severe risk to the U.S. mortgage market by physical risks
resulting from climate change,107 which has been acknowledged by
Federal Reserve officials.108
Physical risks posed to mortgages include wildfires, hurricanes,
and flooding.109 Climate risk is not priced into a significant number of
mortgages,110 many of which the Federal Reserve holds as collateral for
lending programs.111 There are multiple places where climate risk is not
104. Additionally, and outside of the scope of this paper, the Federal Reserve
purchases mortgage-backed securities as part of its open market operations and quantitative
easing programs to achieve the goal of reducing the target interest rate. See FED. RES. BD.,
Open
Market
Operations
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_openmarketops.htm
[https://perma.cc/FDG4-4CYV] (last accessed Oct. 31, 2021) (discussing the Federal
Reserve’s purchases of mortgage backed securities pursuant to its open market operations).
105. See Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, supra note 58
(explaining that Federal Reserve member banks accept agency-backed mortgage securities;
non-agency residential mortgage backed securities; and commercial mortgage-backed
securities in addition to other collateral).
106. See supra Part II.C (discussing assets accepted for various Federal Reserve
lending programs).
107. See Charlie Wowk, Inadequate Climate Risk Disclosures and Information
Asymmetries Threaten to Disrupt the U.S. Mortgage Market, DUKE CLIMATE RISK
DISCLOSURE LAB (Feb. 2021), https://climatedisclosurelab.duke.edu/2021/02/burning-downthe-house-how-inadequate-climate-risk-disclosures-and-information-asymmetries-threatento-disrupt-the-u-s-mortgage-market/ [https://perma.cc/L2VE-6ZE3] (explaining how natural
disasters are currently mispriced in the U.S. mortgage market due to lack of information and
disclosure, how this risk is misunderstood by investors, and how this risk is widespread
throughout mortgage-backed securities thus posing a risk to the greater financial system).
108. See FEDERAL RESERVE, Financial Stability Report: November 2020, at 58-59,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20201109.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F6MH-ELG8] [hereinafter Financial Stability Report: November 2020]
(discussing the significant risk to real estate by climate change-induced wildfires); see also
GOV. LAEL BRAINARD, supra note 83 (“Sudden realizations of climate-related risks could
cause rapid shifts in investor sentiment and shocks to asset prices, including to real estate
prices in specific geographic locations.”)
109. See Wowk, supra note 107 (stating that “[t]he mispricing of [sea level rise] and
wildfires poses a substantial danger to the U.S. mortgage market[,]” exploring the significant
decreases in housing prices from hurricanes, and discussing the inadequacy of FEMA flood
maps—which mandate which houses must have flood insurance, a type disaster not covered
by home insurance).
110. See Erik Hurst et al., Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market,
106
AM.
ECON.
REV.
1,
1-2
(2014),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21007/w21007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9TBF-G57E] (explaining how Government Sponsored Mortgage
Enterprises, who securitize most of the loans in the U.S. mortgage market, do not tailor
mortgage rates based upon likelihood of default derived from climate-related catastrophe).
111. See Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, supra note 58
(explaining how agency-backed mortgages receive between ninety-four and ninety-eight
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properly integrated into real estate.112 First, there is no requirement to
disclose wildfire risk when selling most homes,113 and wildfires increase
the rate of mortgage defaults.114 Second, nearly 40% of the U.S.
population lives in a county on the coastal shoreline,115 leading to a total
of $1 trillion in U.S. real estate located along coastal communities.116
This real estate is subject to hurricanes, coastal storms, tsunamis,
landslides, coastal erosion, and sea level rise.117 As climate-related
catastrophes continue to increase, insurers are having trouble properly
predicting future trends based upon past data, leading to record losses,
increases in insurance premiums, and no available insurance for
homeowners at times.118 Finally, perceptions of climate risk, such as
percent of market value as margin for Discount Window loans, depending upon the length of
the loan).
112. See Wowk, supra note 107 (“[First] extreme weather events can cause rapid
increases in delinquency and forbearance rates, as well as prepayment rates, [second] these
weather events can also increase the number of risky mortgages being securitized and
transferred to the secondary market, and [third] the increased threat of extreme weather
disasters can and should undermine property values.”).
113. Lauren Sommer, Millions of Homes are at Risk of Wildfires, but it’s Rarely
Disclosed,
NPR
(Oct.
21,
2020,
4:50
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/21/924507691/millions-of-homes-are-at-risk-of-wildfires-butits-rarelydisclosed?gsBNFDNDN=undefined&utm_campaign=wp_the_energy_202&utm_medium=e
mail&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_energy202 [https://perma.cc/YJQ2-E9LF].
114. See Paulo Issler et al., Mortgage Markets with Climate-Change Risk: Evidence
from
Wildfires
in
California,
at
34
(July
1,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511843
[https://perma.cc/2WG4LTUL] (“Using a comprehensive data set of houses and mortgages in California between
2000 and 2018, we find, unsurprisingly, that mortgage default and foreclosure increase in the
event of a wildfire.”).
115. NAT’L OCEAN SERV., What percentage of the American Population Lives Near
the Coast? (Feb. 26, 2021), https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html
[https://perma.cc/ES4B-U9XY].
116. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods,
and the Implications for US Coastal Real Estate, 2 (June 2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/underwater-analysis-fullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BJ-33D2] (“[B]y the end of the 21st century nearly 2.5 million
residential and commercial properties, collectively valued at $1.07 trillion today, will be at
risk of chronic flooding.”).
117. See NAT’L OCEAN SERV., What Threats do Coastal Communities Face? (Feb. 26,
2021),
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/coastalthreat.html
[https://perma.cc/N8T5GWK7] (“The threats to coastal communities include extreme natural events such as
hurricanes, coastal storms, tsunamis, and landslides, as well as longer-term risks of coastal
erosion and sea level rise.”).
118. See Noor Zainab Hussain & Carolyn Cohn, Risky Business: Climate Change
Turns up the Heat on Insurers, Policyholders (Nov. 11, 2021, 3:59 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/risky-business-climate-change-turns-up-heatinsurers-policyholders-2021-11-11/ [https://perma.cc/2UCX-8EDD] (discussing how “the
insurance industry . . . has trouble factoring in climate change[,]” leading to insurers pulling
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expected increases in flooding-related damage or wildfire risk, depress
real estate prices and are expected to continue to do so as physical risks
from climate change become more pronounced and more frequent.119
Despite these risks, credit rating agencies—which the Federal
Reserve relies upon120—do not account for risk of wildfires, sea level rise,
or other climate disasters when providing credit ratings for mortgagebacked securities.121 Relative to private market mortgage rates,
government-sponsored enterprises do not risk-adjust mortgage prices
based upon geographic distribution.122 Furthermore, insurers have been
withdrawing from renewing policies in areas hit significantly with natural
disasters such as wildfires.123 Homeowners insurance does not cover
flooding,124 and FEMA’s “flood maps”—that determine land use
out of areas, “coverage getting costlier or harder to come by[,]” and explaining how one
couple “could not get insurance to buy another [home]” after a wildfire burnt their previous
home to the ground).
119. See COMMISSIONER ROSTING BENHAM & BOB LITTERMAN, Managing Climate
Risk in the U.S. Financial System: Report of the Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee,
Market Risk Advisory Committee of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commissions, 1617
(2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/9-920%20Report%20of%20the%20Subcommittee%20on%20ClimateRelated%20Market%20Risk%20%20Managing%20Climate%20Risk%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Financial%20System%20fo
r%20posting.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8WS-ZMBK] (discussing emerging research showing
that perceptions of physical risk from climate change can depress real estate prices, and is
expected to do so, and that “[w]hile climate risk already appears to affect real estate values,
these effects likely will increase as physical risks become more frequent and severe.”).
120. See Discount Window Collateral Eligibility, supra note 76.
121. See Nhu Tran & Cihan Uzmanoglu, Climate Risk and Credit Ratings, 20-21 (Nov.
29,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3708431
[https://perma.cc/6GET-CLJ3] (finding that credit ratings agencies do not factor into credit
ratings in a statistically significant way).
122. See Hurst et al., supra note 110 (“First, risk-adjusted rates are not equalized across
locations within the U.S. monetary union: despite large regional variation in ex-ante
predictable default risk, there is no regional variation in mortgage contract rates for loans
securitized by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Since GSEs securitize most of the
loans in the U.S. mortgage market, this constant contract rate in the face of variation in
predictable default risk implies that the majority of borrowers face risk-adjusted rates which
do vary with their locations. Second, this lack of risk-based pricing does not occur because
this risk cannot be observed ex ante: we show that otherwise similar non-GSE loans that are
securitized in the private market increase (decrease) mortgage rates when ex-ante local default
risk rises (falls).”).
123. Khristopher J. Brooks, California Insurers are Dropping Homeowners
Threatened
by
Wildfires,
CBS NEWS
(Oct.
21,
2020,
1:43
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-wildfires-home-insurers-dropping-homeowners/
[https://perma.cc/79BC-NB8K].
124. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., Homeowners Insurance Does not Cover Flooding
(Apr.
2018),
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/202005/F061_Homeowners_Does_not_cover_flooding.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RDT-B4KF].
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designation and what houses are legally required to purchase flood
insurance to secure a federally-backed mortgage—are extremely
inaccurate.125 However, the Federal Reserve does not appear to integrate
any such risk into the haircut it takes on mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities provided as collateral for its lending programs, due to its
universal haircut guidelines based upon either government-sponsored
enterprise status or the rating given to it by ratings agencies.126
As noted by the Federal Reserve, the lack of climate risk
integration into real-estate-linked assets may lead to sharp repricing,
incentivizing fire sales,127 the effects of which would be amplified
throughout the economy.128 Research suggests that the lack of
geographic climate risk adjustment by government-sponsored enterprises
disincentivizes lenders and borrowers from factoring in risk of natural

125. See Melissa Denchak, Flooding and Climate Change: Everything You Need to
Know, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/flooding-andclimate-change-everything-you-need-know#prevention
[https://perma.cc/CP9X-EW9A]
(discussing how three times as many Americans live within a 100-year floodplain than
estimated by FEMA); see also OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG – 7 –
110, FEMA Needs to Improve Management of its Flood Mapping Programs (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4066233/OIG-17-110-Sep17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SKE8-T355] (assessment that FEMA is vastly underestimating via its flood
maps).
126. See Discount Window Margins and Collateral Guidelines, supra note 58
(showing universal margins for agency-backed mortgages and non-agency-backed
mortgages).
127. A “fire sale” refers to selling of a security or other product at a price that is well
below market value in order to raise money quickly, because the seller is in financial distress.
See
Will
Kenton,
Fire
Sale,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct.
23,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/firesale.asp
[https://perma.cc/5M3L-5EW3]
(explaining what a fire sale is).
128. See Financial Stability Report: November 2020, supra note 108, at 59 (“A sharp
repricing, in turn, could create incentives to fire sale such assets by leveraged financial and
nonfinancial firms.”).
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disaster when purchasing a home,129 despite the fact that mortgage
delinquency rates rise in the aftermath of natural disasters.130
This has led to a scenario where there is current market
distortion,131 potentially leading to an abrupt repricing of mortgages132
held by the Federal Reserve as collateral.133 Repricing would primarily
be due to an increase in mortgage defaults from homes being destroyed
by natural disasters, insurers declining to continue to insure an area or
homeowner's being underinsured against risks such as flooding, or rapid
shifts in market sentiment.134 As discussed by the Federal Reserve, these
abrupt repricing events can pose significant risks to the financial stability
due to the intercorrelated nature of the financial system.135 However, the
Federal Reserve does not integrate any of these potential risks into its
collateral framework,136 creating potential systemic risk, loss of Federal
Reserve money at the expense of the taxpayer, and general market
distortion.
2. Corporate Bonds
The Federal Reserve also faces climate-related financial risks
from its acceptance of corporate debt as collateral. Corporations face
both physical and transitory risks from climate change.137 However,

129. See Amine Ouazad & Matthew E. Kahn, Mortgage Finance and Climate Change:
Securitization Dynamics in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RSCH. at 4-6 (Feb. 2021), http://www.nber.org/papers/w26322 [https://perma.cc/7WASRMF3] (showing that “GSEs do not provide significant incentives to either lenders or
households to choose different locations and mortgage amounts when facing increasing
climate risk[,]” but rather that lenders—instead of decreasing mortgage supply or holding the
same amount of mortgages on their books as prior—originate more loans to GSEs in the
aftermath of natural disasters, leading “GSEs [to] partially act as a de facto substitute for the
National Flood Insurance Program outside of mandated flood insurance zones”) .
130. Id.
131. Wowk, supra note 107.
132. Id.
133. See Supra Part II.C. (discussing assets accepted for various Federal Reserve
lending programs).
134. Wowk, supra note 107.
135. See Financial Stability Report: November 2020, supra note 108, at 58 (discussing
how climate-related repricing events “and direct losses associated with climate hazards can
result in an increased frequency and severity of financial shocks”)
136. See supra Part II.C. (explaining the standardized nature of Federal Reserve
collateral margins and haircuts, depending upon asset type).
137. See GOV. LAEL BRAINARD, supra note 83 (explaining that risks from climate
change include both physical risks and risks from the transition to a more sustainable
economy).
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research has demonstrated that corporate credit ratings do not reflect a
significant amount of this risk.138
In 2019, PG&E filed for what many consider to be the first
bankruptcy caused by climate change, due to being overwhelmed by
California’s wildfires.139 Extreme temperatures, such as those caused by
climate change, significantly impacted earnings in over 40% of industries
from 1990-2015.140 Notably, financiers appear to price in some of the
impact of climate change in premiums charged to bond issuers, but the
impact is not considered by credit ratings agencies.141 Because the impact
of climate change is not incorporated by credit ratings agencies, which
the Federal Reserve relies upon to properly assess risk to the corporate
loans which it accepts as collateral, there is likely risk posed to the assets
the Federal Reserve is holding in return for liquidity loans under its
Section 13(3) and Discount Window lending.
IV. EVALUATING THE COLLATERAL POLICIES FROM THE NETWORK FOR
THE GREENING OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the
Financial System (“NGFS”) is a collection of central banks and
supervisory authorities working to develop best practices for
management of climate risk in the financial sector.142 The Federal
Reserve joined the NGFS in December 2020 after engaging with the
group for over a year.143 The NGFS has stated that central banks should
138. See Edith Ginglinger & Quentin Moreau, Climate Risk and Capital Structure,
EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST at 27-28. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327185
[https://perma.cc/F824-M327] (explaining that “credit ratings do not reflect physical climate
risk specific to the firm" the climate risk faced by the country the firm is headquartered in).
139. See Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not
the Last, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-thefirst-climate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006
[https://perma.cc/CT8J-55CA]
(“PG&E Corp.’s bankruptcy could mark a business milestone: the first major corporate
casualty of climate change. Few people expect it will be the last.”)
140. Elsa Allman, Pricing Climate Change Risk into Corporate Bonds, CITY UNIV. OF
N.Y.
at
6
(July
2020),
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2207&context=bb_pubs
[https://perma.cc/HD9T-YJ3V].
141. Id.
142. Charter of the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial
System,
NETWORK
FOR
GREENING
THE
FIN.
SYS.
1,
2
(2020),
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/media/2020/09/03/ngfs_charter_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5ZN-3SQG].
143. Press Release, FED. RES. BD., Federal Reserve Board Announces it has Formally
Joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System, or
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“seriously consider” how to use the tools available to them to match the
effectiveness of supervisory methods of assessing climate risk, which
might threaten their balance sheets.144
The NGFS released its recommendations in a report (“NGFS
Report”), providing various methods by which central banks may
implement climate-focused monetary policy operations.145 In addition to
various other recommendations, the NGFS Report provides detailed
recommendations for central bank collateral operations, outlined
below.146 Note that while the following explores various collateral
framework policies which the Federal Reserve could implement, it does
not discuss changes that would need to be made with regards to credit
ratings and other methods used to evaluate collateral—such discussion is
deserving
of
its
own,
separate
analysis.
A.

Within the Federal Reserve’s Authority: Collateral Haircuts

The NGFS Report recommends negative collateral haircuts in
order to properly price collateral that is at risk of devaluation from climate
change. A collateral haircut is the amount by which a given collateral
asset’s value is decreased, compared to its market value, in order to better
account for risk posed by the assets utilized to secure the loan.147 NGFS
recommends two potential haircut adjustments: those to account for risk
posed by climate change to assets, and those to support “green” assets.148
Generally, haircuts with an eye towards climate risk are expected to better

NGFS,
as
a
Member
(Dec.
15,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20201215a.htm
[https://perma.cc/TQE5-YUWD].
144. Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some Options,
NETWORK
FOR
GREENING
THE
FIN.
SYS.
1,
2
(2021),
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/media/2021/06/17/ngfs_monetary_policy_operations
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M42Q-JG29] [hereinafter Adapting Central Bank Operations to
a Hotter World: Reviewing Some Options].
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id.
147. See CORY MITCHELL, Haircut Definition and Example, INVESTOPEDIA (July 14,
2020) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/haircut.asp [https://perma.cc/Z5MN-732T] (“A
haircut refers to the lower-than-market value placed on an asset being used as collateral for a
loan. The haircut is expressed as a percentage of the markdown between the two values.”).
148. Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some Options,
supra note 144, at 35.
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protect central bank balance sheets, assuming that the central bank
controls for other financial threats.149
Climate risk is especially relevant to assets held as collateral by
the Federal Reserve for long periods of time, however, the NGFS Report
incorrectly states that climate-related risk to collateral may not be
relevant in cases where a central bank will only be holding the asset for a
short period of time.150 This is particularly relevant to the Federal
Reserve’s lending, as a great deal of it is on a short-term basis such as
overnight, for ninety days, or for “seasonal” liquidity problems.151
However, economic experts are not good at predicting recessions.152
Black swan events have caused rapid decreases in asset prices, and even
so-called “predictable” events such as hurricanes cause unpredictable and
significant losses.153
Rapid decreases in asset prices may occur within an extremely
short period of time, as recently demonstrated during the COVID-19
pandemic.154 For instance, during March 2020 the cumulative total index
for real estate investment trusts focused on the retail sector declined by
49%.155 Risks to retail real estate have been known for years, and “brick
and mortar” stores were consistently closing.156 Yet in the span of a
month, retail real estate dropped drastically, and some expect it to never
149. Seeid., at 36 (explaining that “Many of the options reviewed would probably
better shield central bank balance sheets against increasing financial risks” so long as the
options do not result in higher financial risk concentrations or greater unrelated credit risk).
150. Seeid., at 37 (stating that “[i]f collateral is expected to be liquidated within a short
time horizon, the exposure to climate-related risks may not materialise”).
151. See Discount Window Lending, supra note 11 (explaining that primary credit has
terms of up to ninety days; secondary credit typically has overnight terms; and seasonal credit
terms are adjusted seasonally).
152. Simon Kennedy & Peter Coy, Why are Economists so Bad at Forecasting
Recessions?,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-28/economists-are-actually-terrible-atforecasting-recessions [https://perma.cc/CZB8-LBMY].
153. See supra III.B (discussion of risks to Federal Reserve collateral).
154. Pippa Stevens et al., Stock Market Live Thursday: Dow Tanks 2,300 in Worst Day
Since Black Monday, S&P 500 Bear Market, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2020, 7:15 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/12/stock-market-today-live.html [https://perma.cc/3W38SWE3].
155. David C. Ling et al., , A First Look at the Impact of COVID-19 on Commercial
Real Estate Prices: Asset-Level Evidence, 10 THE REV. OF ASSET PRICING STUD. 669-704
(Dec.
2020)
https://academic.oup.com/raps/article/10/4/669/5902841
[https://perma.cc/V8SB-CBYA] at figure 2.
156. See Suzanne Kapner, Brick-and-Mortar Stores are Shuttering at a Record Pace,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2017, 7:53 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/brick-and-mortar-storesare-shuttering-at-a-record-pace-1492818818 [https://perma.cc/4U6B-W747] (discussing
record retail store closures in 2017).
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return fully with the rise of e-commerce.157 Oil became so severely
oversupplied that, at one point, the futures contract for a barrel of oil was
worth negative $37.63 a barrel.158 Of particular note is the fact that the
price of oil futures dropped to negative $37.63 from $18.27 in a single
day.159 This quick and unexpected decline in oil value occurred despite
the fact that there has been years-long knowledge and discussion of an
oversupply of oil risking price drops in the asset.160 Each of the time
periods in which asset prices plummeted are within the Federal Reserve’s
holding windows for collateral.161 Despite these specific assets not
necessarily being utilized as collateral for Federal Reserve lending, they
share parallels with the assets which the Federal Reserve does accept. In
light of these facts and because of the clear risk of climate-sensitive
assets, current exposure to such assets poses risk which should be
incorporated into the collateral haircuts of even short-term collateral
arrangements.

157. See Melissa Repko & Lauren Thomas, 6 Ways the Coronavirus Pandemic has
Forever Altered the Retail Landscape, CNBC (Sept. 29, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/29/how-coronavirus-pandemic-forever-altered-retail.html
[https://perma.cc/8328-HCRY] (discussing the change in retail stores because of the
coronavirus, including a large shift to ecommerce).
158. William Watts & Mark DeCambre, U.S. Oil Benchmark Crashes Below $0 a
Barrel to Mark Historic Plunge, MKT.WATCH (Apr. 20, 2020, 4:43 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-oils-may-contract-skids-about-20-at-nadir-ascrudes-woes-continue-2020-04-19 [https://perma.cc/82LT-AT48].
159. Id.
160. See Tom DiChristopher, U.S. Crude Drops 2.6% to 14-month Low, Settling at
$49.88, on Oversupply Concerns, CNBC (Dec. 16, 2018, 10:08 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/17/oil-markets-global-economy-in-focus.html
[https://perma.cc/2DWF-QYLJ] (discussing falling oil prices in 2018 due to signs of
oversupply); see also Cathy Bussewitz, OPEC Nations Grapple with Oversupply of Oil, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2019) https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/opec-nations-grappleoversupply-oil-67485052 [https://perma.cc/3SCY-JFEA] (discussing OPEC negotiations
surrounding cutting production of oil in response to oversupply in 2019); see also Oversupply
of Oil and Demand for Gas Expected in 2020, says DWF, OIL & GAS (Dec. 16, 2019, 3:04
PM),
https://www.oilandgasmiddleeast.com/exploration-production/drillingproduction/35718-oversupply-of-oil-and-demand-for-gas-expected-in-2020-says-dwf
[https://perma.cc/L4RL-BHS7] (discussing an expected oversupply of oil in 2020).
161. See MARC LABONTE, supra note 71 at 7-8 (explaining basics of Federal Reserve
COVID-19 lending programs opened in March, 2020, including how the PDCF provided
loans with up to ninety-day terms); see also Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility,
supra note 70 (explaining how TALF loans have a term of up to three years); see also
discussion supra Part II.A (“Loans through primary credit are available for up to ninety days
and have no limits on the use of funds borrowed by the depository institution.”).
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Outside the Federal Reserve’s Authority: “Screening” and
Positive Collateral Haircuts

The NGFS report recommends “screening collateral” that central
banks have traditionally accepted.162 The first option is “negative
screening” in which certain assets are excluded as collateral based upon
climate risk.163 The second option consists of “positive screening”
intended to encourage climate positive activities by expanding the pool
of accepted collateral and adjusting collateral requirements for “green”
assets.164
Negative screening serves as a sort of “amplified” collateral
haircut policy by effectively being a 100% haircut on screened assets.165
Due to being excluded from collateral eligibility in times of crisis as well
as for regular Federal Reserve lending operations, negative screening
would significantly affect the market value of screened assets.166
Negative screening would therefore lead to a significant decrease in the
sort of funding available to those utilizing screened assets;167 this
negative screening could support the transition away from assets subject
to significant climate risk due to their decreased value.168 However,
negative screening is a blunt instrument for climate change,169 and poses
the risk of over-exclusion of assets, which has economy-distorting
effects.170
Positive screening for climate friendly assets would lead to
increased financing options for climate friendly projects due to the
increased market value and ability to use these assets as collateral for

162. Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some Options,
supra note 144, at 37.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 38.
165. See id. (“In fact, an exclusion-based policy is equivalent to applying a 100%
haircut to the targeted assets.”).
166. See id. (stating that “. . . the eligibility of an asset as collateral typically
influences its liquidity and market price”).
167. See discussion supra Part II (explaining how acceptance as collateral for Federal
Reserve lending increases the liquidity of assets in crises and thus their value).
168. Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some Options
supra note 144, at 38.
169. See id. (“[negative screening] is a crude approach”).
170. See id. at 37-38 (“If negative screening is broad, applied to a very large range of
asset classes or based on excessively stringent metrics or criteria, it could restrict the
participation of banks in lending operations.”).
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Federal Reserve borrowing.171 This would expand climate-friendly
financing, as it would expand the universe of eligible collateral rather
than excluding or providing a haircut to already-eligible collateral.172
Generally, the screening of assets based upon climate risk may
serve to incentivize the creation of a green assets bubble,173 which due to
lack of proper measurement174 and greenwashing, could create an
economic bubble.175 “Greenwashing” consists of portraying assets as
more environmentally sound than they actually are.176 Greenwashing is
currently an area of concern for regulators, and is widespread in the
sustainable finance industry.177 Banks often are responsible for
greenwashing, such as promoting their green products while also
171. See id. at 39 (“Positive screening would signal the central bank’s willingness to
improve financing conditions for low carbon projects through the ‘eligibility premium’
incorporated in the price of loans issued to finance these project. The measure may improve
the liquidity and attractiveness of green and low-carbon assets,”); see also supra Part II
(explaining how acceptance as collateral for Federal Reserve lending increases the liquidity
of assets in crises and thus their value).
172. See Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some
Options supra note 144 at 39 (“If anything, the policy would expand the universe of eligible
collateral”).
173 Id.
174 See INFLUENCEMAP, Climate Funds: Are They Paris Aligned? (Aug. 2021),
https://influencemap.org/report/Climate-Funds-Are-They-Paris-Aligned3eb83347267949847084306dae01c7b0 [https://perma.cc/HL6C-LWGA] (explaining how
ESG equity funds—which allegedly take into account climate risk as a core investing
principle, are significantly misaligned with the Paris Climate Agreement).
175 An economic “bubble” consists of the rapid inflation of an asset, or assets, due to
market exuberance rather than the fundamental value of the asset or assets. Typically, bubbles
result in “crash” when the asset or assets drop in value rapidly. See Will Kenton, Bubble,
INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bubble.asp
[https://perma.cc/MV3G-P3E9] (explaining what an economic bubble is).
176. See Will Kenton, What is Greenwashing?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 23, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenwashing.asp
[https://perma.cc/5S8U-VF8J]
(“Greenwashing is the process of conveying a false impression or providing misleading
information about how a company's products are more environmentally sound.”).
177. See Michael Tobin & Davide Scigliuzzo, Wall Street’s ESG Loans Charge
Corporate America Little for Missed Goals, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2021, 12:01 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-08/esg-financing-comes-with-fewpenalties-for-missing-goals [https://perma.cc/6DKE-ELXW] (explaining how sustainabilitylinked loans often have few consequences if the borrow fails to meet the sustainability target);
see also INFLUENCEMAP, supra note 174 (“In the broad ESG category, this report identifies
593 equity funds with over $265 billion in total net assets. Of the funds assessed, 421 of them,
or 71%, have a negative Portfolio Paris Alignment score, indicating the companies within
their portfolios are misaligned from global climate targets.”); see also Ricardo Boffo & Robert
Patalano, ESG Investing: Practices, Progress and Challenges, OECD PARIS, 9 (2020),
https://www.oecd.org/finance/ESG-Investing-Practices-Progress-Challenges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX2F-EV8S] (“Agencies and expert groups are prioritizing sustainable
finance to promote sustainable investments and reduce the risks associated with a missing
framework, such as greenwashing.”).
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providing significant financing for fossil fuel endeavors.178 It is often
hard to discern whether greenwashing has occurred due to a lack of
current industry standards surrounding disclosure of climate risk.179
Utilizing screening would vastly encourage greenwashing of assets in
order to have them qualify for Federal Reserve collateral inclusion.180
This would not serve the purpose of the Federal Reserve’s lending
programs,181 and also runs counter to the risk-tailoring the central bank’s
collateral policies seek to embody.182
Positive collateral haircuts may also serve to distort markets.
While regulatory scrutiny is increasing,183 there is still strong potential
for a green bubble to occur without Federal Reserve incentivization,184 as
it is unclear that green assets perform significantly better than other
assets.185 For instance, sustainable investments generally have seen
increased valuation solely by way of increased flows of investments,

178. See Akshat Rathi & Saijel Kishan, Banks Get ESG Upgrades Despite Lending
Billions
for
Fossil
Fuels,
BLOOMBERG (Feb.
4,
2022,
9:30
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-04/banks-get-esg-upgrades-despitefossil-fuel-financing [https://perma.cc/3TPE-QBJ6] (explaining how MSCI “is rewarding
some of Wall Street’s biggest banks [with ESG rating upgrades] even though they continue
to lend billions of dollars to fossil-fuel companies”).
179. See Boffo & Patalano, supra note 177 (“Moreover, the lack of standardized
reporting practices and transparency, and the difficulty of translating qualitative information
in numerical information, creates a barrier in the proper integration of sustainability factors
into investment decisions.”).
180. Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some Options,
supra note 144, at 38-39.
181. See supra Part II (explaining how the Federal Reserve is charged with promoting
safety and soundness of the financial system generally, and how the Federal Reserve’s
Discount Window and Section 13(3) lending facilities are designed to promote stability by
providing liquidity).
182. See supra Part II.C (“Discount Window loans provided by the Federal Reserve
must be fully collateralized ‘to the satisfaction of the lending Reserve Bank.’ Similarly,
Section 13(3) collateral must be ‘sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses[.]’”).
183. Tim Quinson, Regulatory Intensify ESG Scrutiny as Greenwashing Explodes,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 1, 2021, 5:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0901/regulatory-scrutiny-of-esg-greenwashing-is-intensifying [https://perma.cc/C22W-K97Y].
184. Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Speech at the
Green Swan Conference, Transparency and Market Integrity in Green Finance (June 2,
2021), https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp210602.htm [https://perma.cc/5A5L-KLV7].
185. See North American Non-Bank Financials Increasingly Tap Green Bonds, FITCH
RATINGS: FITCH WIRE (May 27, 2021), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/non-bankfinancial-institutions/north-american-non-bank-financials-increasingly-tap-green-bonds-2705-2021 [https://perma.cc/WY33-N9NH] (“The credit performance of green bonds has
historically been similar to non-green bonds given that credit risk is typically identical, as it
is based on the issuer’s credit profile and not the use of proceeds.”).
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rather than any increase in expected returns.186 While the market for
climate-based investing is in excess of $35 trillion, there is concern that
climate finance is currently similar to other assets “related to fundamental
economic and social change” such as the dot-com bubble or nineteenth
century railroad stocks.187 This poses a problem for the implementation
of a positive collateral haircut because increased valuation of a green
asset without an underlying increase in intrinsic value could create, or
further support, a green bubble.188 In contrast, negative collateral haircuts
would take a more nuanced approach of decreasing the value of the
collateral in proportion to its risk, but not entirely remove its ability to
receive funding.189
Clearly, a large-scale incentivization of greenwashing or a green
bubble would be directly counter to the Federal Reserve’s stability
mandate.190 Moreover, any intervention based upon a wish to incentivize
green assets, rather than tailoring for the risks posed by climate-risky
assets, would fall outside of the scope of the Federal Reserve’s stability
and liquidity mandates.191
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve has increasingly acknowledged that climate
change poses significant threats to the financial system.192 Additionally,
the Federal Reserve takes on risks to its balance sheet through its
collateral operations—as acknowledged by the existing collateral
framework and the fact that it applies various haircuts to different types

186. Philippe van der Beck, Flow-Driven ESG Returns, SWISS FIN. INST. RSCH. PAPER
NO. 21-71 (Sept. 23, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3929359
[https://perma.cc/X76Y-X9Q5].
187. Catherine Bosley, Green Investment Frenzy Runs Risk of Becoming a Bubble, BIS
Says,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
20,
2021,
7:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-20/green-investment-frenzy-runs-riskof-becoming-a-bubble-bis-says [https://perma.cc/HWN8-ZQYQ].
188. See supra Part IV.B (discussing greenwashing).
189. See Adapting Central Bank Operations to a Hotter World: Reviewing Some
Options, supra note 144, at 35-36.
190. See supra Part II (explaining how the Federal Reserve is charged with promoting
safety and soundness of the financial system generally, and how the Federal Reserve’s
Discount Window and Section 13(3) lending facilities are designed to promote stability by
providing liquidity).
191. Id.
192. See GOV. LAEL BRAINARD, FED. RES. BD., supra note 83 (discussing risks to the
financial system from climate change).
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of collateral.193 There is significant risk to the Federal Reserve by climate
change, including physical threats to assets such as houses and transition
threats to corporate bonds.194
The Federal Reserve should address climate risk in its collateral
policies.195 To avoid doing so flies in the face of its stability mandate, as
there is risk of holding assets at risk of rapid depreciation as collateral.196
The Federal Reserve should carefully value climate-sensitive assets by
using the NGFS recommendations surrounding collateral haircuts to
ensure that they are risk-adjusted.197
However, the NGFS
recommendations surrounding incentivizing green assets by way of
screening or positive haircuts are outside of the Federal Reserve’s
statutory authority and likely to subject it to significant political scrutiny
and legal challenges.198
BENJAMIN J. MARSICO*

193. See supra Part II.C (discussing Federal Reserve collateral policies).
194. See supra Part III.B (exploring risks from mortgage-backed securities and
corporate bonds).
195. See supra Part III & IV (discussing risks to the Federal Reserve by its current
collateral policies and utilizing haircuts to reduce this risk).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra Part IV (discussing issues with utilizing screening and positive
haircuts).
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